Execute Commands on SageMaker Notebook Instance via Lifecycle Configuration
slow idempotent
Platform: AWS
Mappings
- MITRE ATT&CK
- Execution
- Privilege Escalation
Description
An attacker with permissions to stop, update, and start a SageMaker Notebook instance can execute code inside this instance by attaching a malicious lifecycle configuration script to a stopped instance. When the instance is restarted, this script executes automatically, allowing the attacker execute arbitrary commands, for instance to exfiltrate the instance's IAM execution role credentials.
Warm-up:
- Create a SageMaker Notebook Instance with an IAM Execution Role that possesses sensitive privileges (the victim role).
- Create an Attacker IAM Identity with only the permissions to stop, update, and start the notebook and to inject a malicious lifecycle configuration script.
Detonation:
- Update the lifecycle configuration script via a Stop-Update-Start API sequence
- Execute malicious code
References:
Instructions
Detection
Through CloudTrail's UpdateNotebookInstance events.
You can also watch for suspicious sequences of StopNotebookInstance and StopNotebookInstance events correlated with UpdateNotebookInstance events.